

*Monique Plaza*

## *Our Damages and Their Compensation*

*Rape: The Will Not to Know  
of Michel Foucault*

For some years we have been fighting to have rape recognized as a violent act committed by the class of men against the class of women. This struggle is difficult, because we have against us the judiciary system and, on top of that, the ideological conception which prevails in all that concerns rape: rape is supposed to be a "sexual act" committed by a man *with* a woman; the lack of consent of the woman is supposed to constitute the sole illegality of the act of rape.<sup>1</sup> In most cases the nonconsent of the woman is denied, and the justice system aims at proving that the sexual act was desired, called for, sought by the woman. Parallel to this supposed desire of the woman, the statements (of the justice system, of the mass media) affirm a certain *image of man*, the natural predator with overdeveloped sexual instincts.<sup>2</sup>

Our denunciations seem to have been partially heard. A certain (small) number of members of the Left Wing intelligentsia recognize that rape is a violent act, and that the struggle which we are carrying on against it is politically legitimate. Thus Michel Foucault, or David Cooper, well known for their subversive interpretation of power relationships in contemporary society, denounce the violence of rape and debate strategies to be implemented (on the juridical level, essentially) to combat the effects of it. Despite the esteem in which I hold Cooper and Foucault, I must say that their arguments, far from furnishing a theoretical-political underpinning for our struggle, denote on the contrary a closure, a "great confinement," and are all the more

pernicious to the extent that they are, in other respects and in part, *abstractly* (idealistically) just. It seems to me that a *new-look ideology* is in the process of being formed these days on the subject of rape — an ideology certainly more subtle than the traditional one, but whose danger is to lock us into a “double bind” which will have the most frightening political effect.

I would like to pay particular attention here to taking apart this double bind. It is important that we should not enter into its paradoxical logic, in order to pursue our fight by analyzing the contradictions of our struggle, but without taking a step backward.

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In October 1977 the “Collectif Change” published a volume entitled *La folie encerclée*.<sup>4</sup> In it are transcribed a series of debates on some themes relating to repression (particularly psychiatric repression). One of these discussions particularly caught my attention, because it dealt with rape. It is Michel Foucault who introduces it:

There is today in France a Commission for the Reform of the Penal Code, which has already been functioning for several months (in the expectation of a change of government?), and has taken some unimportant decisions up to the present. To my surprise they have telephoned me, telling me: We are in the process of studying the chapter of the legislation on sexuality. We are very perplexed, and we would like to know what you think about it. . . . there are two areas which are problematic for me — that of rape, and that of children. (*La folie encerclée*, pp. 98-99)

The question of rape is raised, one sees, in a clearly directed way. On one hand, it is envisaged in relation to the theme of the penalty, thus more from the standpoint of the rapist; and on the other hand, it is inscribed within the general problem of “sexuality.” This orientation is not going to be without consequence in the debate.

In my view, the perplexity of Foucault derives from the fact that he is caught in a political contradiction: rape is a crucial issue for the feminists, who have proclaimed the fact that “in every man there is a potential rapist.” Now, who speaks here, through the voice of Foucault? A famous philosopher, certainly, but also a man. And this man, far from declaring his political incompetence to speak in the first place on this problem, provides a “theoretical” assertion, which right away presents a hypothesis as something obvious, and does this in the form of a sort of taboo:

One can always adhere to the theoretical discourse which consists of saying: in any case, sexuality cannot under any circumstances be the object of punishment. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 99)

At first sight, I thought: “It’s true.” There is such conviction in the formulation that Foucault gives of this “theoretical discourse” that you say to yourself: “It is certainly just.” Where does this immediate ideological agreement come from? Apparently it derives from two facts. On the one hand, we scarcely support the notion

of “punishment,” which seems reactionary to us, because it is linked for us to the theme of repression. On the other hand, for some time the West has bemoaned the sexual repression which the puritan and Victorian society supposedly imposed on us. Therefore, “sexuality” and “punishment” immediately have a negative effect — a linkage to be banned, an association to be rejected.

However, past this wall of obviousness, we pose a question: What about “sexuality”? As Foucault has devoted a book<sup>5</sup> to it, we can refer to this book in order to understand what the notion of sexuality covers for him. Sexuality, says Foucault, is the product of a power over the body:

. . . this power had neither the form of the law, nor the effects of the taboo. On the contrary, it acted by multiplication of singular sexualities. It did not set boundaries for sexuality; it extended the various forms of sexuality, pursuing them according to lines of indefinite penetration. It did not exclude sexuality, but included it in the body as a mode of specification of individuals. . . . It produced and determined the sexual mosaic. Modern society is perverse, not in spite of its puritanism or as if from a backlash provoked by its hypocrisy; it is in actual fact, and directly, perverse. (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 47)

“Sexuality” is then *the product of a power*, a power which must be defined according to Michel Foucault in terms of

. . . manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, [which] are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 94)

Foucault postulates that, beginning in the eighteenth century, this power developed four great strategic unities concerning sex: “a hysterization of woman’s body,” “a pedagogization of the child’s sex,” “a socialization of procreative behavior,” and “a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure.” What was at issue in these strategies, says Foucault, is *the very production of sexuality*.

It is thus this sexuality — product of a whole system of power in which women prove to be the privileged victims (and not solely through the hysterization of their bodies!) — that should not be punished. What should then be penalized?

. . . and when rape is punished, it is exclusively the physical violence that should be punished. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 99)

If we understand correctly, it is a matter of arranging it in such a way that “sexuality” escapes the penal code, that this sexuality (*that is to say, the system of power which has the bodies of women as its object of privileged appropriation*) not be forbidden, but only the “violence”:

. . . and to say that it is nothing but an assault, and nothing else. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 99)

This repetitive denial arouses our attention. What do this “nothing but,” this “nothing else” connote if not the buried affirmation of a *specificity of the violence of rape*? An affirmation which evades and hides behind the negation. What is misunderstood here? What is at stake in this misunderstanding? Michel Foucault?

For there can be no misunderstanding that is not based on a fundamental relation to truth. Evading this truth, barring access to it, masking it: these were so many local tactics which, as if by superimposition and through a last-minute detour, gave a paradoxical form to a fundamental petition to know. (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 55)

What “local tactic” of power is at work in this persistent denial? What positive (complete) practice does it prescribe? What is “the unknown” of the specificity of rape which is masked in this curious “defense” of sexuality?

. . . whether one punches his fist in someone’s face, or his penis in the sexual organ makes no difference . . . (*La folie encerclée*, p. 99)

Who is this “one” who speaks? “One, man,” I was taught at school! Man, in fact, this bearer of the penis capable of entering “the sexual organ.” But (let’s play the fool) what is “sex”? Let us refer to *The History of Sexuality*.

. . . “sex” was defined in three ways: as that which belongs in common to men and women; as that which belongs, *par excellence*, to men, and hence is lacking in women; but at the same time, as that which by itself constitutes woman’s body, ordering it wholly in terms of the functions of reproduction and keeping it in constant agitation through the effects of that very function. (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 153)

Thus, as the penis is here defined as nonsex, one must believe that sex is implicitly the bodies of women. Let us stop here a moment. Rape must not be punished as sexuality. As what must it be punished, since it seems to be uniquely sexual? In fact, in order to describe it, Foucault opposes two terms: (1) “his penis,” that is to say, the genital organ of man; (2) “sex”, that is to say, if one follows Foucault theoretically, the bodies of women, which have been reduced to “sex.” But “sex” can also designate in French the genital organ of women (their vulva, their vagina) which does not here rate being named as does the penis. For the moment women are not named, while men are, through the intermediary of their penis. This differential treatment could give rise to an interesting hypothesis — because men also rape *men*. Socially the anus of a man can be put into the position of “the sexual organ,” or a (biological) man can be put in the place of “bodies of women” and be appropriated as such. Jean-Michel was raped and recounts in *Histoires d’Elles*: “I had been raped like a woman, I was looked upon as a hole, and I didn’t want to be a woman any more; I didn’t want above all to be a homosexual, still worse. . . . I wanted bluntly to be almost macho . . .”<sup>6</sup>

Precisely, what is rape? Is it or is it not a “sexual” practice? We need to agree on the notion of sexuality. *Rape is an oppressive act exercised by a (social) man*

*against a (social) woman, which can be carried out by the introduction of a bottle held by a man into the anus of a woman; in this case rape is not sexual, or rather it is not genital. It is very sexual in the sense that it is frequently a sexual activity, but above all in the sense that it opposes men and women: it is social sexing which underlies rape. If men rape women, it is precisely because they are socially women, or even more because they are "the sex," that is to say, bodies which they have appropriated, by the exercise of a "local tactic" of a nameless violence. Rape is sexual essentially because it rests on the very social difference between the sexes.*

So, using the reversals and paradoxes so dear to Foucault, I would say the following: Whether one punches his fist in someone's face, or his penis in the sexual organ does make a difference — the difference between the sexes. For men rape women insofar as they belong to the class of men which has appropriated the bodies of women. They rape that which they have learned to consider as their property, that is to say, individuals of the other sex class than theirs, the class of women (which, I repeat, can also contain biological men).

If then, in our society, rape is sexual, what does the fact of not punishing the sexual in it mean? Foucault, who in his theoretical assertions has forgotten that in our society there is a class of men and a class of women, and that rape must be referred to this social reality, suddenly remembers something:

But first: I am not sure that women would agree . . . (*La folie encerclée*, p. 99)

At last, we are named. "The sex" is us. Us, who? The spoil-sports. We might not agree? Come on, Michel Foucault, you know very well that *we do not at all* agree. We have shouted, written, debated, organized — against rape. We have appealed to the courts against rapists. All this is proof that for us rape is not an assault like any other, that being punched in the face is not the same thing as being raped.

And, in fact, the two women present at the discussion (Marine Zecca and Marie-Odile Faye) showed their disagreement, putting the accent on the existence of a very everyday and very intense oppression of women *in the sexual arena*. Foucault then gives a piece of outside information:

I discussed this yesterday with a magistrate of the Magistrates' Association. He said to me, "There is no reason to penalize rape. Rape could be outside criminal law. It should be made simply a matter of civil responsibility: financial compensation." (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100)

There is no reason *to forbid rape*. Rape is permitted; the raped woman will "simply" go and ask for damages. In other words, she will go to be paid for a sexual act that a man has committed "with" her without her consent. Thus: every woman is the sexual prey of men, whether she does not say a word (and "consents"); whether she demands remuneration before the act (prostitution); whether she demands remuneration after the act (rape).

But let us be more precise and imagine the scene.

—Mrs. Y brings charges; she says: I have been injured by Mr. X (since one is not raped — rape does not exist). She has her injuries recorded. And there the round of questions is going to begin: “But you do not have any lesions. Where is the sperm? Didn’t you consent? Where are your witnesses?”

—Mr. Z. brings charges: he received a blow of the fist in his face, given by Mr. X (the same assailant X). He shows his black eye. Will he be asked if by chance he consented? Will they try to take scraps of skin from the fist of Mr. Z? Certainly not. For *Mr. Z and Mr. X do not have the same power relationship as Mrs. Y and Mr. X*. Because it happens that a blow of the fist in someone’s face is an abnormal act generally conceived of as aggression, while putting his penis in “the sexual organ” is a normal act *never conceived of as aggression*: women belong to men, the vagina belongs naturally to the penis.

Thus, to make rape a “simple” matter of civil responsibility, is quite simply *to permit rape* — to go against women, who have revealed it to be one of the most violent manifestations of the oppression that they suffer.

Relating this scandalous opinion of a magistrate of the Magistrates’ Organization (an organization known in general for its “advanced” ideas), Foucault turns again towards women:

What do you think about it? I say: you, women . . . because in this men, unfortunately perhaps, have a much less persistent experience. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100)

Really, Michel Foucault? I think, on the contrary, that men unfortunately have *without any doubt* a much *too* persistent experience of rape — as rapists, of course. Oh yes, Michel Foucault, if rape were an aggression *like others*, men would have a much more persistent experience of it as a reality that they have suffered; you see very well that it is not an act of violence like others, and that you cannot resolve the question. Because, from the place of potential rapist to which your status as a man “subjects” you, you can only hide the networks of oppressive power that women are subject to, you can only defend the right of rapists.

And, in fact, the discussion gets involved in a defense of rapists. Marine Zecca seems disturbed by the way things are presented. It is from the point of view of the oppression of women here and now, of what rape represents as an *oppressive tactic* that the problem could be posed — in order to move next into a strategy against rape. But the whole discussion is from the point of view of the rapist, of what men want to have the right to do with complete impunity, of the restraints which they do not want to see appear. In the context of discussions which dealt with repression, and as long as the problem of rape was posed by men, what else could Marine Zecca say but:

I can’t manage to look at this from the legislative point of view, from the point of view of “punishment” —for it is that which disturbs me. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100)

As to Jean-Pierre Faye, he develops a line of argument without ambiguity:

On one hand, in the name of women's liberation, one is on the antirape side. And in the name of antirepression it's — the reverse? (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100)

In other words, on the other hand one is for rape?!!! But then what repression are they talking about? For if women demand a "liberation," it is certainly from *the repression, the oppression that they suffer*. Let us lay out the terms of the debate: (a) to be "antirape": in the name of women's liberation (I add here: this demand for liberation only having meaning in a context of oppression being suffered); (b) to be "the reverse," thus "for rape": in the name of antirepression (I add: of men; thus for the maintenance of the oppression-repression that they exercise over women). Is what underlies this expression not the myth of the "sexual misery" of men, of the repression which they already suffer, and which should not be increased by the penalization of rape? How does it happen that Michel Foucault does not intervene in the discussion, he who denounced the postulate of sexual repression for 159 pages in his book? It is doubtless because one of the functions of this myth escapes him: that of masking the oppression of women by men. Not only does this dimension escape him theoretically, but also he uses it politically for his purposes: is there not something here like a will not to know?

Marie-Odile Faye presents rape, precisely, in its aspect of being *contrary to the idea of a "sexuality freely consented to, nonpenalized."* (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100) This seems to bring Jean-Pierre Faye back to a vision a little more contradictory of things:

It (rape) has itself a repressive side . . . but repression of rape, how are we to imagine that? (*La folie encerclée*, p. 100)

A repressive side: in other words, it has a *nonrepressive* side? Liberating, perhaps? Indeed, for men! It is the interest of men which is again the subject at issue. For when they say that it poses a problem for them that a practice (which we judge to be *completely repressive*) be repressed (forbidden and penalized if it takes place), what do they say except that *they want to defend the freedom that men have at the present time to repress us by rape?* What do they say except that *what they call (their) freedom is the repression of our bodies?*

But Michel Foucault comes back to his point and asserts that the contradiction that the two women brought up poses problems:

For one ends by saying this: sexuality as such has, in the body, a preponderant place; the sexual organ is not a hand, it is not a hair, it is not the nose. It must be protected, surrounded, at all events, vested with legislation which will not be that which is valid for the rest of the body. (*La folie encerclée*, pp. 100-101)

If I understand correctly, through the fault of women sexuality *is going to* acquire a preponderant place, *is going to* be surrounded. Really, Michel Foucault,

you exaggerate. Have you forgotten that this has *already* been done? Have you forgotten that sexuality “far from being repressed [in contemporary society], on the contrary [is] constantly aroused” (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 148)? Have you forgotten that “All along the great lines which the development of the deployment of sexuality has followed since the nineteenth century, one sees the elaboration of this idea that there exists something other than bodies, organs, somatic localizations, functions, anatomo-physiological systems, sensations, and pleasures; something else and something more, with intrinsic properties and laws of its own: ‘sex’” (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 152)? Haven’t you understood that it is we women who are affected the most harshly by precisely this “deployment of sexuality,” that it is we whom it injures the most gravely? And have you not understood that if we demand the destruction of the “difference between the sexes,” it is in order to destroy this oppression? It is certainly not we who wish that the sexual organ not be a hair: *it is exactly this that we are demanding*. But we cannot function in an ideal state and act as if — here and now — the sexual organ was a hair! That would cost us dearly, and would save you a lot of questions.

Foucault’s line of argument is dangerous in that it risks making us, women, guilty. What men — situated in a patriarchal power relationship — persist in creating and perpetuating (the oppression of women, the “difference between the sexes,” the primacy of sex) they impute to us as wanting to create and perpetuate. They say to us: you want to make rape something else than aggression — therefore, you are pansexualists; you want to punish rapists for raping you — therefore, you are repressive.

This imputing of guilt seems to be effective in the discussion. Marine Zecca, speaking of children being raped, says: “This is no longer a sexual act, I believe, it is really physical violence.” (*La folie encerclée*, p. 101) Now can one think that for the adult woman who is raped, rape is not physical violence? Either that or we must examine the notion of “sexual act”: the adult woman would become used to it — used to this violence inherent in man-woman relationships — and she would, in short, see rape in every sexual act. This would be reversed in the proposition: rape is a sexual act. *It is the refusal of an explicit linkage between the sexuality that we know today and violence which leads the discussion into an impasse*. This dissociation between violence and sexuality, which women cannot easily make, is completed by David Cooper:

Rape is nonorgasmic. It is a sort of rapid masturbation in the body of another. It is not sexual. It is injury. (*La folie encerclée*, p. 101)

In other words, it would be “sexual” if it resulted in orgasm. Whose orgasm, if not that of him who masturbates rapidly in the body of another? There is a confusion here between sexuality and pleasure (of the man).<sup>8</sup> The absence of pleasure [*jouissance*] does not mean the absence of sexuality. Furthermore, sexuality can be injuring; an injury can be specifically sexual. One can, of course, dream of a good heterosexuality — nonviolent and orgasmic. But it happens that this is just a dream, and that reality shows us sexuality as a very precise and very well organized apparatus of oppression.



Rape must not be cast into an Elsewhere, into “another area” than that of sexuality, that is, of the relationships of power as they are established in a very everyday way between men and women. What should be done, on the contrary, is to *bring contemporary heterosexuality to a position very close to rape*, and to take great care not to dissociate them.

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Let us summarize the important elements of the discussion and their ideological substructure. Rape thus should not be penalized insofar as it constitutes a right that men have, and penalizing it would restrict their freedom — “repress” them. That this freedom is our repression matters little since in the antagonism between sex classes, which is very clearly revealed here, it is men who must *preserve their privileges*, and not women who must *win the right to struggle against one of the forms of appropriation of their bodies that they suffer*.

Up until now the ideology governing the approach to the problem of rape posed man as a sort of goat in rut whose ardor does not bear any shackling, as an unrestrained bestial being. This was a naturalist discourse, which defined man with unequalled violence and horror, and which permitted the situation where the injustice of contemporary social relationships was not posed. The male rapist had to be ascribable to nature, not at all to an oppressive society. It was preferable to propose a lobotomy<sup>9</sup> to reduce his “instinct to rape,” rather than to make him recognize the oppression of women in which he as a (social) man participates. In order to combat this naturalist ideology we have asserted that rape is not ascribable to sexuality. But we must also assert at the same time that *rape is sexual*, insofar as it refers to social sexing, to the social differentiation between the sexes, and because we must not dissociate heterosexual sexuality from violence.<sup>10</sup>

The *new-look* ideology, which coexists with the former one, does not itself refer to the image of the man-goat. It is based on a much more contradictory set of themes.

—*On one hand*, we are told that “sexuality” has nothing natural about it, that it is not a given, an object in itself, that, on the contrary, it is produced by the social modalities of power over the body. *Moreover*, it is conceded *theoretically* that this sexuality oppresses women more particularly.

—*On the other hand*, we are asked to make of this social practice a *special condition*, at the level of judicial practice, by ignoring it. *Moreover*, we are reproached for considering it as something special, for not pushing it aside, when we consider it as oppressive and want to defend ourselves against it *in practice*.

We are subjected thus to contradictory statements. For if sexuality is an oppressive social practice particularly privileged in contemporary society, *we cannot* ignore it or leave it to one side.

The “double bind” to which we are subjected is explained by the fact that *the debate counterposes antagonistic interests*: those of the rapists and those of the victims, those of men and those of women. The “revolutionary” thinkers cannot completely refuse to recognize this antagonism at the present time. They cannot use

naturalist ideology to explain/justify rape. Therefore they proclaim another one, starting, they too, from the situation of the male rapist. They do not deny that rape is violence, but they make themselves "the defense counsel" and say in the first place: men rape because they live in a repressive society. However, this argument is not very serious. Why don't women rape since they live in this same society? Then our thinkers propose a second argument, which is clearly superior since it does not seem to defend rapists. It can be summarized thus: rape is an act of violence like any other ("individual" violence, carried out "at random"); for the purpose of this argument it is appropriate to not talk any more about sexuality. Obviously, since referring to sexuality would risk showing that what takes place in rape has something to do with the existence of antagonisms between the class of men and the class of women, with the existence of an oppression of women by men.

All of us women have to constitute ourselves as "the plaintiff" in order to become at last the real counsel for the defense: *that is, to defend the victims of oppression, raped women.*

Michel Foucault, you have not clearly analyzed the place of the "enunciative modality,"<sup>11</sup> which you adopt when you talk about rape. If you had, when the Magistrates' Association asked you to give your opinion about rape, you would not have launched right away into a completely preemptive "theoretical" explanation. You would have first "turned toward the women" who are currently struggling. And you would not at any time have tried to convince us that *we* are mistaken. You would not have lost a certain political memory, and you would have remembered that insofar as we are exposed in the front lines in the strategic field of patriarchal power relations, we are in the best position to structure

resistances, each of them a special case: . . . possible, necessary, improbable; . . . spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, . . . violent, [irreconcilable]. . .<sup>12</sup> (*The History of Sexuality*, p. 96)

## Notes

1. I say "the sole illegality" because for me the illegality does not lie only there (I would even say: not there at all). In fact, what does "to consent" mean if not to acquiesce in, to permit, a situation imposed by another, a situation which is *the act of the other*? In the case of rape, "consent" would be the acceptance of the objectification, of the violence which another inflicts on you. The notion of "nonconsent" is the only recognized illegality, whereas it is *the possibility of the whole system of rape which must be outlawed*. However, this system, let's not forget, is legal:

"Marriage, by virtue of the obligations that it imposes on the spouses, authorizes the husband to perform on the wife, even despite her and by violence, the act which conforms to the aim of marriage. It does not permit, on the other hand, obtaining "unnatural" relations by violence" (Extract from *Répertoire pratique* of Dalloz, p. 13, cited in *Le programme commun des femmes*, presented by Gisèle Halimi [Paris: Grasset, 1978] p. 205).

2. Cf. Martine Le Péron, "Priorité aux violées," and Gisèle Fournier and Emmanuel Reynaud, "La Sainte Virilité," *Questions Féministes* no. 3 (Mai 1978).

3. A process described by Anglo-Saxon psychology, and central in English antipsychiatry, to account for the paradoxical character of a message. The message is structured in such a way that it affirms something and affirms something else concerning this affirmation; these two affirmations are mutually exclusive. In the parent-child relation, this process could produce madness.

4. Change, *La folie encerclée* (Paris: Seghers/Laffont, 1977).
5. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume I, An Introduction* (New York: Vintage Books, 1980). Originally published in French as *Histoire de la sexualité I, La volonté de savoir* (Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1976).
6. Cf. "un trou . . . rien qu'un trou" [a hole . . . nothing but a hole], remarks collected by Dominique Pujebet, *Histoires d'elles*, no. 3, p. 22.
7. A play on the French title of Foucault's book, which can be translated as: *The History of Sexuality I, The Will to Know*. (Trans.)
8. Rather: a certain form of pleasure [*jouissance*] which men can sometimes dream about — an ideal pleasure which would produce a "good," "equal" relationship with a woman. In fact, rape without any doubt gives the rapist a great deal of pleasure which "liberated" men reject. Others, on the contrary, insist upon it and boast about it with exaltation. (cf. the works of Michel Sardou.)
9. A psychosurgical technique aiming at severing a part of the brain matter considered responsible for a behavior disorder. The fact that a television program on rape displayed a rapist who had been normalized by a lobotomy shows the extreme ascendancy of the naturalist ideology. It is probably considered just a sample case; doubtless few men would have to submit to a lobotomy. But ideologically the "explanation" and its practical implication are ready to hand. But it is not without interest to point out that when it is a question of rape, man is treated as a biological entity (something which is ordinarily reserved for women), and that one can even think of applying to him a "curative" (mutilating) technique that is also more particularly "reserved" for women. Cf. for example: Peter Breggin, "La lobotomie revient," *Les temps modernes*, no. 321 (1973), pp. 1773-1792.
10. The definition that I wish to give of heterosexuality will be sociological and not biological. I do not refer to the meeting of a vulva and a penis, but to a sexual practice that is structured on the existence of a difference between the sexes — by the existence of "men" and of "women." In this sense, it can be said that the rape of Jean-Michel committed by men is ascribable in a sociological sense to heterosexuality, since Jean-Michel was appropriated as a "woman" by men ("macho" types).
11. Cf. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1976). The notion of "enunciative modality" integrates the place from which the author of the discourse speaks — what is her/his character as defined by statutory modalities, what are the institutional positions from which she/he utters her/his discourse. It is necessary to add here all the diverse strategies that organize the power relations in the social formation.
12. I omit from Foucault's sentence the following: "quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial." These phrases have too much of the taste of defeat and death.